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Summary findings
In 1980, China's government owned and controlled its  government that allows them to earn a rent;  that
state enterprises, whicn were managed (inefficiently) by  advantage leads to suboptimal efforts.
bureaucrats. During the  1980s, the government  Among Xu's findings:
experimented  with decentralizing state enterprises to  *  The ways the government and enterprises
boost productivity. By decade's end, China's state  partitioned  property rights were consistent with the
enterprises had become more market-oriented,  and the  prediction of the principal-agent model based on the
structure of enterprise property  rights had changed  above assumption.
dramatically.  Many of the changes in property  rights reflected the
Xu examines how China's government and state  government's  attempt to cope with managerial
enterprises partitioned  property rights - how the  informational  advantage.
government and enterprises decided about incentives,  *  The government, in striving for equality, rewards
financial arrangements,  and control rights.  inefficient firms while penalizing efficient ones (the so-
Xu assumes that the government is risk-neutral and the  called ratchet effect). Efficient firms are unwilling to
enterprise manager is risk-averse; that the government's  reveal their true efficiency. They pretend to be inefficient
goal is to increase revenue (or profitability), to retain  by slacking, so they can get more transfers. So, there are
control of the firms, and to reduce the inequality of  inherent conflicts between two of the government's
income across firms (by bailing out firms in financial  goals: profitability and equality. And the government's
trouble and collective heavier taxes on high-performing  desire to control  state enterprises prevents many of them
firms). The enterprise manager and employees, on the  from becoming decentralized and improving their
other hand, have an informational advantage over the  productivity.
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Property rights of state owned enterprises (SOEs) display large cross-sectional and time
series variations. A case in point is Chinese SOEs in the 1  980s. As will be shown later,
Chinese SOE managers faced firm-specific profit retention rates, had different production
decision rights and discretion in employee wage determination, and financed investments
from different sources---some relied more on govermment  funds, some on bank loans, and
the others on their own retained profits.  What determines how the involved parties
partition property rights? What are the behavior patterns of the government and SOEs in
this process? These questions are the central concerns of this paper. A positive study of
the political economy of property rights will help us better understand SOEs' behavior,
including the objectives and constraints of the government; it may, therefore, enable us to
offer better prescriptions for reform of SOEs.  As yet, these questions have not been
addressed systematically, and this research attempts to fill that void.
The theoretical approach used here highlights the asymmetry of information
between the government and managers to examine how the principal (the government)
and agents (managers) partition control rights and incentives. To curb the information
advantage of  SOEs, the government designed incentives and control rights based on the
finns'  characteristics---such as the risks they faced, their sizes, capital intensities, and
past performance. For instance, for firms facing a "nosier" environment, the government
often designed lower profit sharing and retained more centralized production decisions to
mitigate risk; for firms with higher capital intensity, the govermment's goal of
maintaining the value of equipment was likely to be in conflict with the employees'
short-run bonus motives when profitability-based pay was imposed. Thus monitoring was
more likely to be used than pay sensitivity in inducing internal labor incentives in capital-
intensive firms.
The empirical implementation and tests were carried out using A Survey of State
Enferprises: 1980-1989, a panel data set consists of 769 firms over 1980-1989. Firms in
1this data set display variations of property rights both in cross section and time series
reflecting the differential timing of many decentralized reforms. The rich variation in
property rights and the size of the data set allow us to examine in detail the determinants
of property rights such as management turnover, profit retention rates, production
decisions, financing arrangements, and wage control rights.
We find that the property rights configurations were in general consistent with the
implications of a principal-agent model in which the government had at least three goals:
profitability (or tax revenue), control over firms, and inter-firm equality -- through bailing
out firms in financial troubles, and collecting heavier taxes on well-performing firms. The
property rights structure also reflected government attempts to deal with the information
problem relying on the rationality of SOEs: it designed high-powered incentives -- that is,
higher firm-level pay sensitivity -- for efficient firms, which accepted this type of contract
because they expected high revenue associated with their high productivity, and it used
low-powered incentives and more centralized control for inefficient firms, which chose
this type of contract in anticipation of low productivity.
II. The Data and the Decentralized Reforms
This research uses A Survey of State Enterprises: 1980--1989, a retrospective survey
conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 1991.2  The data set is a balanced
one: no firms were dropped out during the 10 years.  The survey questionnaires were sent
out to 800 state enterprises. Valid responses of  769 firms, located in 21 cities in  four
provinces of  China (Sichuan, Jiangsu, Jilin, and Shanxi), were returned. This data set
was not designed to be a random sample of the state enterprises: large firms were over-
2This data set has been  used by many other  authors,  including  Groves  et al., "Autonomy  and
Incentives  in Chinese  State  Enterprises,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  109(1)  (1994); "China's
evolving  managerial  labor  market,"  in  Journal of Political Economy, 103(4)  (1995).
2represented, making up more than 70% of the sample; the median firn  had 931
employees.
The data set consists of two parts. Part one, filled out by accountants of the firm
surveyed, contains quantitative tables with details of the firm's production inputs,
outputs, internal incentives, wages, and profits.  Part two, answered by the manager of
the firm, includes information about the firm's industry affiliation, governance status,
when the firm was granted the discretion to plan output and what  product to produce,
when the firm adopted the Management Responsibility System, and whether the manager
had the discretion to determine wage setting.
Change in Property Rights Structure of State Enterprises in the 1980s
At the beginning of the 1980s, both ownership and control of Chinese SOEs belonged to
the state:  the government collected all profits, and allocated the entire investment fund,
wage, and collective welfare expenditures (such as firm-specific housing and medical
facility).  The managers did not have autonomy over production decisions and employee
cornpensation.  State enterprises were largely managed by bureaucrats. Without a link
between rewards and performance, the managers and employees did not have incentives
to work hard.
During the 1980s, the government experimented with decentralizing state
enterprises to boost productivity. By the end of the decade the property rights structure of
SO:Es  had changed dramatically, becoming much more market-oriented. 3 Meanwhile the
3For more thorough  coverage  of industrial  reforms and the rural reforns of China, see D. Gale
Johnson,  The  People's Republic  of China:  1978-1990,  San  Francisco:  ICF Press, 1990; Gene Tidrick and
Chen Ji Yuan, China's  Industrial Reforms,  New York: Oxford  University  Press, 1987;  Dwight Perkins,
"Completing  China's Moves to the Market, Economic Perspectives, 8 (1994), 23-46; and  Jefferson and
Rawski, "Enterprise Reform in Chinese Industry," Economic Perspectives, 8 (1994), 47-70.
3labor productivity of the firms in the data set increased at 2.6% annually. 4 The individual
reforns  are described below; their trend is displayed in table 1.
1. Increasing profit retention rates.  SOEs faced two retention rates: the base
retention rate for the profit below or at the base amount, and a marginal retention rate for
profit above it.5 The average base retention rate increased from 17% in 1980 to 39% in
1989, most of this increase occurring before 1986. The average marginal retention rates,
lower than the average base retention rates, increased more smoothly:  from 11% in 1980,
to 17% in 1984, and 27% in 1989. The variation across firms and over time was
Table 1. Trends of the Decentralized Reforms in the 1980s
80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89
Average  base  retention  rate  .17  .19  .22  .30  .34  .37  .39  .38  .39  .39
Average  marginal  retention  rate  .11  .12  .11  .14  .17  .17  .19  .23  .26  .27
% firms with  production  autonomy  .07  .08  .10  .14  .25  .35  .40  .53  .64  .67
Average  mandatory-plan  share  Not Available  .64  .62  .60  .58  .57  .57
% firms with  wage discretion  .01  .01  .01  .02  .05  .09  .12  .20  .32  .35
% firms under  MRS  .00  .00  .00  .01  .02  .04  .08  .42  .83  .88
Average  firm-level  pay sensitivity  Too Few Observations  .51  .39  .41  .46  .43  .42
for firms  under MRS
% investment fmanced  by  .27  .26  .24  .21  .20  .17  .14  .13  .12  .10
government  funds
% investment  fnanced by  .17  .18  .20  .22  .25  .33  .32  .34  .33  .28
bank loans
% investment  fmanced  by  .08  .08  .09  .12  .12  .12  .12  .12  .15  .15
profit retention
% firms  with management  turnover  .09  .01  .06  .10  .16  .14  .07  .15  .10  .09
Source: A Survey of State Enterprises: 1980-89.
4It  may be useful  to know  that there  were two complementary  conditions  that allowed  SOE
reforms  to work. First,  SOEs  became  increasingly  active  in both  the input  and  product  markets.  Between
1980  and 1989,  the share of material  inputs  purchased  through  the market  rose from 32%  to 59%,  and the
share  of output  sold on the market  rose up from  49% to 60%.  Second,  the SOE sector  faced  increasing
competition  from the non-state  sector:  in 1980,  collective  and other  non-state-owned  industries  accounted
for 21% of gross value  of industrial  output;  by 1991  this figure  had risen to 47%.
5According  to MRS in practice, the determination  of base  profit was largely  exogenous--usually
some  weighted  average  of past  profits, or simply  one-period  lagged  profit. See  Research  Group for the
Chinese Firm System Reform, System Reform Committee, Management Responsibility System in Practice,
Beijing, China: The Economic Management Press, 1988.
4substantial.  A firm could use retained profit to invest, improve collective welfare, or pay
ernployee bonuses. However, the manager's freedom in using retained profit was limited
by many constraints such as a bonus cap, a very high progressive tax rate, or increasing
dependency on self-financing for capital investment, for which the government was
previously fully responsible. In the rest of the paper, the base retention rate is viewed as a
transfer mechanism, and the marginal rate as an incentive device for the firm.
2. Autonomy of production decisions. At the beginning of the 1980s the
government controlled most of the production plans for SOEs. Throughout the decade it
gradually granted some firms more autonomy on production decisions, mainly in six
areas: value and  physical quantity of output, and choices of product, technology,
production scheduling, and exports.6 In our data set the share of SOEs with production
autonomy increased from 7% in  1980 to 25%  in 1984, 53% in 1987, and 67% in 1989.
Another indicator of production autonomy is the share of output under the government's
mandatory plan (mandatory plan share hereafter):7 a low value implies a high level of
production autonomy for the firm. The average share dropped from 64% in 1984 to 57%
in 1989.
3.  More managerial discretion to determine employees' wages. Traditionally the
government set an employee's wage by an almost deterministic function of personal
observables such as age, education, location, and tenure, leaving managers with no
leverage to induce employee efforts.  Worse yet, managers could not fire employees.8 To
6
These  types of production  decisions  were delegated  around  the same  time, with the exception  of
production  scheduling,  which  came  earlier,  and exports  autonomy,  which  came  later.
7A state enterprise's  output fell  under three categories:  mandatory  plan by the government,  which
is set up by the govermment  and must be fulfilled, directive  plan that was suggested  by the government,
and own  plan which  was under  the discretion  of the manager.
Part of the reason  was that the "fallback  position"  for the fired  employees  implied  great
hardship: it was very difficult  to find  jobs outside  the incumbent  firm  due to a rigid labor  market;  in
addition,  since  the social  security  and  welfare  function  was canried  out  by the state enterprises  rather  than
the market  or the state,  the dismissed  employees  would  lose much of their firm-specific  investments  such
as housing,  tenure  wage,  pension  plan if they left the incumbent  firms.
5improve internal labor incentives, the government granted managerial wage discretion
(called the flrm-specific wage scheme) for managers to base employees' wages on their
observed productivity,  controlling only either the firm's  aggregate wages or their growth
rate. That managerial discretion, presumably, could be manifested in determining
employee wages based on his output (pay sensitivity) and on his effort and skills
(monitoring); yet, in a team production setup, managers could not tell each employee's
productivity. Individual-level pay sensitivity is thus precluded from being a component of
that discretion. In the rest of the paper, therefore, managerial wage discretion is justifiably
viewed as managers' heightened right to monitor as an incentive device for employees. 9
The share of firms with managerial wage discretion increased in the latter 1980s: it was
only 0.5% in 1980, 5% in 1984, then jumped to 20% in 1987, and 35% in 1989.
4. Making a firm more self-financing. A SOE could finance its investment
through government funds, bank loans, and profit retention. Traditionally the government
funds were the major source. Over the decade the share of finance attributable to bank
loans and profit retention increased: the figure for by bank loans was 14% in 1980, 22%
in 1984, 32% in 1987, and 27% in 1989; for profit retention the figure was 13% in 1980,
15% in 1984, 15% in 1987, and 17% in 1989. In the rest of the paper, direct government
finance is regarded as a redistributive mechanism: since its funds are more heavily
subsidized than other sources, greater reliance on government funds indicates larger
transfer to SOEs.
5. Management (or Contract) Responsibility System (MIRS)  and firm wage
elasticity.  '0 The counterpart to the Household Responsibility System of the Chinese
9In  this  paper,  monitoring  refers  to that  performed  by  managers  on employees.  We  do not discuss
the  monitoring  the  government  conducted  on  the  firms,  for  we  do not  have  a good  measure  of government
monitoring  on  firms.  While  production  autonomy  may  sound  like  lessened  government  monitoring  on
firms,  it is not clear  that  was  the  case.
'0AII  information  about  MRS  is from  MRS in  Practice.
6agricultural reform, I  MRS was, perhaps, intended to be the most dramatic reform for
SOEs. MRS is a performance contract signed between the government and a SOE,
usually for a duration of 3-5 years. Under the contract, the manager was granted some
discretion to make decisions within the firm, and was supposed to fulfill specified
targets.  12 Typically a MRS contract specified the distribution of value added between the
state and the firm, performance requirements such as the minimum annual expenditure on
capital maintenance, the number of new products to be developed, the volume of output
to be delivered to the state and its price, the dependence of  CEO compensation on the
peirformance  of the firm, and the way the total wage bill was linked to the firm's profit
level-- that is, an  ex ante wage elasticity with respect to profit.  Bear in mind that this
firm level pay sensitivity existed only when the firm was under the MRS. Given the
co]mplexity  of contract provisions, MRS often resembled an imposed state plan. It was
not clear, therefore, that it gave the manager more independence.  In the rest of the paper
MRS is interpreted as the government's attempt to use performance contracts with
incentive components (as measured by firm-level wage elasticity) to govern SOEs. Most
firms did not adopt MRS until 1987. Almost none had a MRS contract in 1980, only 2%
of the sample in 1984, but  42% in 1987, and  88% in 1989.
6.  Increasing management turnover. Over the decade, an increasing number of
firms experienced management turnover, especially from 1983-85 and 1987-1989. The
figure was 9% and 6% of firms in 1980 and 1982, and then jumped to 16% and 14% in
"Justin Yifu Lin, "Rural  Reforms  and Agricultural  Growth  in China,"  American  Economic
Review,  82 (1992),  34-51;  McMillan  et al. (1989),  "The  Impact  of China's  Economic  Reform  on
Agricultural  Productivity  Growth."  Journal  of Political  Economy,  97 (1989),  781-807. Both  authors
attributed  the adoption  of the Household  Responsibility  System  as the major source  of the unprecedented
increase  of farming  productivity  in China in  the first  half of the 1980s.
12Usually,  the MRS  contract  for a firm was signed  by the industrial  bureau,  which was a branch
of government  in charge of industrial  SOEs, and by some  representatives  of the firn, including  the
manager--the  winner  for the contract.  The winner  was determined  by a committee representing  the
government,  and sometimes  also the employees  of the firm.
71984 and 1985; it dropped to 7% in 1986, then increased to 15% in 1987, and dropped
again to 10% and 9% in 1988 and 1989.
III  Hypotheses about the Determinants of Decentralization
Using a principal-agent (PA) approach, this section discusses what determines the way
the government and SOEs decide internal and managerial incentives, financing
arrangements, and control rights over production decisions. Consider this PA
relationship: the government as the principal is risk-neutral, and the manager of a SOE as
the agent is risk averse. For some reforms, I shall also consider a PA relationship between
the manager as the principal and his employees as his agents. The government is
postulated to have three goals: increase revenue (or profitability), retain control of SOEs
which represent high control amenity -- that is, utility from directly controlling the firms -
-to the government, and reduce the inequality of income across firms. Managers and
employees have an informational advantage over the government that allows them to earn
a rent, and that advantage, as a result, causes sub-optimal effort and investment levels. To
reduce the informational asymmetry, the government can design managerial and
employee incentives, control rights and performance contracts to align the objectives of
13 the SOEs with those of the government.  The manager, of course, may opt for the more
centralized status quo if the firm is better off than under the considered reform.
Incentives, Control and Risks
In designing incentives the government would like to differentiate between firms in terms
of the risks they face, and strike a balance between incentives and insurance.14 In
13 See Laffont and Tirole (1993), chapter 1, A Theory  of Incentives in Procurement and
Regulation, the MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.
14For  surveys on principal-agent models, see David Sappington, "Incentives in Principal-Agent
Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2), 1991,  p. 45-66; Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole,
"The Theory of the Firm," in Schmalensee R., and R. Willig eds., Handbook of Industrial  Organization,
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989.
8particular, other things equal, firm facing relatively greater risks should be given more
insurance, corresponding to lower-powered incentives (in our context, lower marginal
profit retention rates). Since in these risky firms the government cannot rely on sufficient
incentives, it instead will rely to a larger extent on controlling the operation of the firm
directly. Thus we expect more risky firms to have less production autonomy.  Further, a
firm facing higher risks would be less likely to choose MRS as that option would expose
them to a larger extent to risks. In other words, the relative gains from the risk-free nature
of the centralized status quo may often be larger for these firms. Thus we conjecture that
firms facing more risks will lean less toward adopting MRS. Let us call the above the
insurance-incentive-tradeoffhypothesis.  A brief summary of all the hypotheses will
appear in table 5 at the beginning of section V, and in another form in table 2 at the end
of this section.
AIRS, Pay Sensitivity and Efficiency Level
In designing MRS contracts (including the pay sensitivity), the government has to
balance two conflicting goals: effective incentives and extracting rents enjoyed by
SOEs. 15 Because of managers' information advantage the government cannot distinguish
efficient from inefficient firms.  To induce firms to reveal their own types, the
government can offer a menu of MRS which differ in incentive intensity and insurance
coverage. Incentive intensity is reflected in firm-level pay sensitivity (to profits).16  To
illustrate, assume the manager's utility function increases with monetary rewards ( which
are equal to a lump sum transfer plus shared profit), and decreases with effort level. The
government offers two types of MRS contract: the high-sharing type with a high firm-
level pay sensitivity (high-powered incentives), and a low amount of fixed transfer (low
insurance), and the good-insurance type with a low pay sensitivity, and a high amount of
15 Laffont  and Tirole  (1993). See note 13.
16 Ibid.
9transfer. Consider the subset of firms for whom both types of contract represent higher
utility levels than that under the centralized mode. The inefficient firms will prefer the
good-insurance type: the managers know that they will not obtain a large profit, therefore
their utility is maximized under the contract with a high transfer, low pay sensitivity, and
low efforts.  In contrast, the efficient firms will prefer the contract with high pay
sensitivity: they know that they will be able to reach a large profit level, thus the utility
level associated with the high wage amount, the low transfer and corresponding high
efforts will be larger than under the alternative contract. Of course, there would still be
firms that opt for no participation in MRS: for extremely inefficient firms, even the good-
insurance MRS contract would expose them to some risks, whereas the centralized status
quo offers more insurance.
The above separating equilibrium improves efficiency in comparison to offering
the same contract to every firm. I shall illustrate by showing that 3 cases of pooling
equilibrium do not work as well as the separating equilibrium. Case 1: offer a large
transfer and large pay sensitivity to both types of firms. They will all accept gladly.  But
this incentive scheme will leave the SOEs with too much rent, an undesirable outcome
since the state's budget constraint is tight and public funds are generated through
distortionary taxes. Case 2: offer a large transfer and a low pay sensitivity to both types.
All inefficient firms will accept the contract.  Some efficient firms will stay at the
centralized mode; others will accept the contract. As a result, efficient firms yield lower
efforts than if they had high pay sensitivity and a low transfer.  In this case, slacking on
the part of efficient firms prevents the maximization of the social welfare (the
government's plus the firms' utilities).  Finally case 3: offer a low transfer and high pay
sensitivity.  Then the efficient firms will participate but the inefficient will not. As a
result, the inefficient type will yield a lower effort level than if it participates in the high-
insurance contract type. Again, social welfare is likely to be lower than that in the
separating equilibrium. While the choice of MRS contract may successfully cope with
10hidden information problems, it cannot overcome the moral hazard problem: whereas the
efficient firms will work hard due to the high-incentives contract, the inefficient firms,
due to the low incentives for the good-insurance contract, will not work as hard as when
the government has perfect information.
The above analysis offer testable implications for MRS status and its associated
incentive components, namely pay sensitivity. The theory implies that efficient firms will
choose MRS with a high pay sensitivity, while inefficient ones will choose either a low
pay sensitivity or not to adopt MRS. We call this the self-selection hypothesis.
Initernal  Labor Incentives, Firm Size and Capital Intensity
When the government decides if the manager should be granted the rights to control a
firm's internal incentives, it will take into account the information structure underlying a
firm's size and its capital intensity. Due to the inseparability of team members'
productivity, employees enjoy a certain amount of discretion that may run counter to the
objectives of the government.'7 To align the incentives of the employees with its goals,
the government can choose two types of incentives: allow managers to monitor (rewards
based on input) or use pay sensitivity (rewards based on output).
The government would dictate that, employees in more capital-intensive SOEs be
more closely monitored (i.e., depend more on managerial wage discretion) and less
ma,tivated  by pay sensitivity so that the danger of equipment abuse in the presence of pay
sensitivity would be mitigated. Pay sensitivity  based on current profitability can be
especially harmful.  That is, a firm's current profit can simply be boosted by under-
investing and over-utilizing machines which may reduce future capital stock (or its
growth), therefore, hurting the long run objective of the government. Monitoring
em;ployees  in capital-intensive firms are more attuned to the longer term goals of the
17  Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H. "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization."
The  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 62, No. 5 (December 1972).
11government, the abuse of capital is more likely to be prevented. In this way, the rewards
for workers in capital-intensive firms should be less based on short-term outcome
measures such as profitability (i.e. should exhibit less pay sensitivity).
The government may also prefer that larger firms have stronger internal labor
incentives in order to compensate for the loss of control associated with a burgeoning
workforce. When a firm's size increases, employees enjoy a larger extent of discretion.
So a firm with a larger size needs stronger internal labor incentives to induce desirable
employee actions, both in the form of pay sensitivity and managerial wage discretion.
These hypotheses relating pay sensitivity and managerial wage discretion to firm size and
capital-intensity are called the Alchian-Demsetz hypotheses.
Management Change and Firm Characteristics
Managerial slacking can be curbed by taking advantage of their career concern. 8 The
government can threaten the manager with losing his job and reputation if he is judged to
have done a poor job. The government infers his effort by observing the firm's
performance: if it turns out to be poor, he is more likely to have shirked, and thus will be
more likely to be replaced. Management turnover incentives, however, should be more
carefully used when a firm faces intrinsically higher variability of profits. For these firms,
it is harder for the government to discern whether poor performance is due to technology
or demand shocks or due to managerial slacking.  As a result, the government should be
more reluctant to replace the managers whose firms face higher uncertainty. Finally, the
government's profitability (or revenue) goals dictate that larger firms will find their
managers replaced more readily, for the economic benefits of replacing a bad manager
increase monotonically with the size of the firm. These hypotheses are referred to as the
management-discipline hypothesis.
]8  Sherwin  Rosen,  "Contracts  and The Market  for  Executives,"  in Lars Werin  and Hans
Wijkander,  eds., Contract  Economics,  Oxford,  UK.:  Basil  Blackwell,  1992.
12Centralized Control, Firm Size, and Capital Intensity
In giving different controls to SOEs, the government sacrifices differential benefits in
terms of control amenity.'9 Implementation of different reforms, moreover, incurs
different governance costs. These considerations will partially determine how the
incentive structure and control rights are related to a firm's size and capital intensity.
In deciding on MRS status, the government sees more control amenity in more
capital-intensive firms, because it cares for capital maintenance and accumulation besides
profitability. When capital-intensive firms become more independent, the government has
to worry more about their tendency to abuse equipment or not accumulate capital in
single-minded pursuit of short run profits. The analysis of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991)  20 is relevant to our discussion: when the principal pursues multiple goals (for
example, profit and capital accumulation in our case), a stronger reward (MRS with pay
sensitivity in our context) for one objective (profit in this case) might lead the firm to
sacrifice others. The principal, therefore, may opt for low-powered incentives (no MRS or
MRS with lower pay sensitivity). One might naturally assume that, by the same line of
reasoning, more capital-intensive firms would also be less likely to have production
autonomy. This is not, however, true. First, the granting of production autonomy was not
associated with strong incentives for one objectives versus the other(s), while MRS is
19 See Demsetz  and Lehn  (1985),  in H. Demsetz  (1988),  Ownership,  Control  and the Firm,  New
York:  Basil  Blackwell.
20 See Bengt  Holmstrom  and Paul  Milgrom,  "Multitask  Principal-Agent  Analyses:  Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journla of Law, Economics, and Organization 7(1991): 24-
52.
13clearly associated with pay sensitivity.  Second, as will be discussed later, production
autonomy (but not MRS) and capital intensity are complementary in raising productivity.
A larger firm represents better control amenity to the government.  It has more
employment at stake; and it produces a more strategically important product (such as
steel and energy).  As a result, the government tends to maintain control over production
of larger firms. In these firms we expect the government to rely on a more centralized
control mode, as indicated by less production autonomy to the firm, higher mandatory-
plan share, lower-powered profit-sharing regimes (low profit retention rates), and larger
shares of investment financed by government funds.  We call the hypotheses in this and
last paragraph the control-amenity hypothesis.
To the extent that MRS may also have an autonomy component, the control
amenity hypothesis imply that large firms (which have higher control amenity) are less
likely to have MRS. An important caveat, however, is that it is not clear how much more
autonomy a firm had after the adoption of MRS.  The main feature of MRS was not
production autonomy; rather, MRS represents the government's attempt to use a
performance contract with an incentive component to govern firms. The government
could, after all, substitute targets of the MRS contract for direct control, and, therefore,
maintain its grip on the firm. Indeed, production autonomy reform largely preceded MRS
reform: in 1986, 40% of firms had production autonomy whereas only 8% of firms had
MRS.  By 1989, while 88% of firms had MRS, only 67% of firms had production
autonomy. In addition, whereas from 1986-1989 the share of firms under MRS rose from
8% to 88%, the mandatory-plan share dropped only minimally, from 60% to 57%.
14There is another  reason  why larger firms  may  be less  likely to have MRS  (as
predicted  by the control-amenity  hypothesis),  and they are more likely  to obtain
production  autonomy  (opposite  to what is predicted  by that hypothesis);  it is because
larger  firms are associated  with lower  governance  costs. It is surely  easier to directly
manage  a large firm with 100  employees  than  to manage  100  firms  of one employee.
Giiven  the extent  of information  costs, the government  can economize  by first  pushing
MRS in larger  firms  because  their agreements  entails  lower  relative  negotiation  costs and
enforcement  costs---after  all the government  has to audit the accounting  books  to evaluate
thie  firm, go through  the management  selection  process,  then sign  the contract  regardless
of a firm's size.  Notice  that larger firms  do not necessarily  adopt MRS  more readily,  for
control-amenity  hypothesis  suggest  the opposite.  Similarly,  lower  per capita  governance
costs for larger firms  also imply that these firms  are more likely  to be governed  by the
government  itself, and thus are less likely  to enjoy production  autonomy.  We call this
governance-costs hypothesis.
SOE Property Rights and the Goverment's Revenue and Equality Motives
The revenue  (or profitability)  motive of the government  dictates  that more  capital-
intensive  firms  should  be more likely  to implement  the reforms  that  raise total factor
productivity.  Just imagine  a production  function:  y-=  Ak' L TFP 8 , where  y is per capita
value added,  A a constant,  k capital  intensity,  L the number  of employees,  and TFP  total
factor productivity.  Since  TFP increased  with marginal  profit  retention  rates,  production
autonomy,  managerial  wage  discretion,  firm-level  pay sensitivity,  and decreases  with the
21  1 am indebted  to a referee  for this point.
15mandatory-plan share, apparently k and these reforms are complements in raising a
firm's value added (  >  0).22  Thus, when pursuing  revenue,  ceteris paribus, the
a kaTFP
government is likely to allow more capital-intensive firms a higher marginal retention
rate, larger firm-level pay sensitivity, a lower mandatory-plan share, higher likelihood of
production autonomy, and of managerial wage discretion. This is called the TFP-capital-
complementarity hypothesis.
As postulated earlier, besides revenue and control, the government also wants to
reduce income inequality across firms.  This objective adds further shape to the
configuration of property rights.  First, the government can selectively allocate
investment in favor of poor firms by giving them increased access to government funds,
which are offered free of charge or at preferential rate.  Second, the government may
permit poorer firms to have higher base profit retention rates, which represents a lump
surn transfer. Note that marginal retention rate will not be used: it has incentive therefore
real allocative effects, a consequence not intended by redistritutive purpose.
Finally, the government may grant more production autonomy to bail out firms in
trouble, knowing that firms with production autonomy tend to achieve better
productivity.  While some may find it odd that the government would redistribute
through giving poor firms productivity-enhancing policies, it needs not be, at least for the
Chinese government, which has granted many cities special policies in attracting foreign
22 In addition,  it  was  found  that,  when  we did  not  allow  differential  effects  of new  management  by
governance  (i.e.,  by central,  provincial,  prefecture,  and country  governments),  TFP did not increase  with
the presence  of new management.  See  L. Colin  Xu, "The Effects  and Determinants  of Decentralized
Reforms,"  Ph.D.  thesis,  the University  of Chicago,  1996.
23 Xu (1996)  found  that  firms with  production  autonomy  have significantly  higher  productivity
levels  and growth  rates.
16capital, and given many poor regions tax exemptions and more independence in
governance. Since production autonomy increases productivity for all types of firms, it is
demanded by all firms; since the government enjoys control, the government is more
likely to give up control to firms where its cost is lower: relative to giving production
autonomy to rich firms, giving it to poor firms at least increase the government's utility
by reducing income inequality and is therefore more likely. We call these hypotheses
raised here the equality-motive hypotheses.
Why doesn't the government transfer cash directly to firms to avoid distortion? It
may be that it faces substantial cost in breaking its own budget constraint; moreover,
direct cash transfers are more visible and therefore entail higher political costs than the
afore-mentioned methods. Additionally, some might ask, why not just decentralize
production and give financial independence to poorly-performing firms? After all, these
firms are most in need of restructuring. The answer is that these firms are not willing to
participate in some cases. Production autonomy will make firms better off, thus poor
firms will accept production autonomy. In contrast, participating in MRS and having
hig,h-powered  incentives, as discussed earlier, are associated with lower lump sum
transfer, leaving poor firms worse off, so they will not participate. What is more, MRS in
particular and performance contracts in general were not associated with substantial
productivity gains.24  Therefore, it does not appear to be an effective redistributive
mechanism. Similarly, because financial independence for poor SOEs is not as
comfortable and risk-free as under the centralized status quo, it is often not embraced;
moreover, financial independence entails hard budget constraints, which were not feasible
given that the government did not want to bankrupt firms.  In short, when some
decentralized reforms threaten their status quo, poor firms may not participate.
24 In Bureaucrats  in  Business  (the World  Bank, 1995,  Oxford  University  Press:  New York),  it is
found  that  the use of performance  contracts  on SOEs  had minimal  gains. Xu (1996) (see  xxi) finds  MRS  to
have also  negligible  gains (except  its pay sensitivity  components,  which  was associated  with  significant
productivity  gains).
17Table 2 summarizes the hypotheses about the determinants of the reforms.
Table  2. Summary  of the relationship  between  reforms  and Several  Key Variables
Reforms:  Determinants of Reforms:
Efficiency  Risks  Number of  Capital intensity
level  employees
Base retention  -: equality  ?-:  control-amenity  ?
rate  motive
Marginal  ?  -: insurance-  -: control-amenity  +: TFP-capital-
retention  rate  incentive  complementarity
tradeoff
Probability:  -: equality  -: insurance-  -: control-amenity  +: TFP-capital-
Production  motive  incentive-  -: governance-  costs  complementarity
autonomy  tradeoff
Mandatory plan  +: equality  +: insurance-  +: control-amenity  -: TFP-capital-
share  motive  incentive-  +: governance-costs  complementarity
tradeoff
Probability: MRS  +: self-selection  -: insurance-  -: control-amenity  -: control-amenity
incentive  +: governance-costs
tradeoff
Firm-levelpay  +: self-selection  ?  +: Alchian-  -: control-amenity
sensitivity  Demsetz  -: Alchian-Demsetz
+: TFP-capital-
complementarity
Managerial  wage  ?  ?  +: Alchian-  +: TFP-capital-
discretion  Demsetz  complementarity
+: Alchian-Demsetz
The change of  -: management-  -: management  +: management  ?
management  discipline  discipline  discipline
% of investment  -: equality-  ?  +: Control-amenity  ?
from gov'tfunds  motive
Note. +, -, and ? imply a positive, a negative, and an ambiguous relationship.
IV. Empirical  Strategy  and Findings
This section presents empirical results of the determinants of property rights and tests the
hypotheses proposed in the last section. Alternative estimation  strategies will be used
depending on whether the dependent variable is discrete or continuous. For binomial
reform variables---the managerial wage discretion, MRS, and autonomy --a binomial
18Probit  model is estimated, 25 and  the samples  consist  of those  years  when the considered
26  -bsan reform  was not adopted  or had just been adopted.  For continuous  variables  -- base and
marginal  retention  rate, financing  variables,  and the mandatory-plan  share  ---we estimate
O]LS,  fixed  effects,  and random  effects  models,  using all observations  for which  the
dependent  variables  are not missing.  Specification  tests will be used to examine  these
alternative  models.  27 For each specification,  only the best results are reported  based  on
statistical  criteria.  In examining  firm wage  elasticity,  since  it was a constant  for all the
years following  the adoption  of MRS,  and not observed  or non-existent  for firms  without
a MURS  contract,  our sample  consists  of all MRS-participating  firms  in the year  when
MRS was adopted.
Based  on the considerations  of the last section,  the included  explanatory  variables
are as follows.
1.  Profitability  of thefirm last  year (In  y,t,): a proxy for the efficiency  level of the
firm. One  might question  whether  last year's profitability  adequately  captures  the price
and subsidy  differences. We will therefore  use a function  of subsidies  to predict  property
rights,  including  subsidy  variables  such  as financing  arrangements  and base retention
rates. As will be pointed out later,  we shall  control  industry,  governance  and  year
dummies,  which  should  filter out industry-,  governance-,  and year-specific  price and
subsidy  differences. In addition,  because SOEs  became  increasingly  active  in the market
by selling  part of their products  and buying  part of their inputs from the market,  the plan
2-The underlying  assumptions  of binomial  Probit  model  are as follows.  Let  the outcome,  y, be
either  0 or 1. lety* be an index function  such  thaty is I if y*2 0, and 0 if y*< 0. Assume y* = kg + s,
where  X is the determinants  of outcome  y, and f  the associated  parameters,  and e  the disturbance  term.
Then probability(y  =  1) = probability(13 + E > 0) = (D(XAI).
26In this sample,  once you had one of the three afore-mentioned  reform dummies,  you had it till
the end of our sample period.  Therefore,  only years before a reform or the year reform was adopted are
relevant  sample  when  we examine  the determinants  of that reform.
27We use F-test  to choose  between  OLS and fixed effects  model, Hausman's  test between  random
effects and fixed effects  model, and Breusch-Pagen  Lagrangian  multiplier  test between  OLS and random
effects  model.
19price difference embodied in the profitability measure became less and less important.
Profitability in the prior year, therefore, became an increasingly reliable measure of a
firm's  efficiency. Moreover, for continuous variables, which include subsidy variables
(financing variables and base retention rate), we shall experiment with fixed effects
models which are likely to filter out firm-specific subsidies and price differences.  Taken
together, these steps should ensure that last year's  profitability is a reasonable proxy for
efficiency.
2. Riskiness of the environment:28  represented by the coefficient of variation for
profitability (lny,)  -- its standard deviation over its mean --computed by industry x year
cells (thus it has both cross-sectional and time series variations). In the calculation there
are ten industries, and ten years (1980-89), so a firm could receive one of 100 risk
indicators.
3. Production structure of the firm: the capital-labor ratio (In k), and the
employment of a firm (In L). Capital is measured by the total net fixed capital stock
divided by the number of employees. It is deflated by firm-specific price index,
constructed from the data set. 29
4. Governance dummies.30  Firms with alternative governance status had a
different  tendency to decentralize, as each governance status represented both distinct
amenity of control to the government and different executive procedures to implement
reforms.  Moreover, the governance status of a firm was closely related to the subsidy
level it received from the government: in general, the higher the authority of the firm's
governing agency, the higher the subsidy level.
2 Demsetz  and Lehn (1985) considered  the noisiness of environment as a factor  that determines
the diffuseness  of corporate  ownership.  I follow  their tradition.
291 have also  experimented  with  a province-specific  consumer  price index,  and the empirical
results  remained  similar.
30From  the data set, we know that the higher authority  of the governing  body,  the more  controlled
(lower)  the output price,  and the more  subsidized  the inputs.
205. Industry, province, and year dummies. Industry dummies control for systematic
differences in control amenity to the government  across industries. Provincial  dummies
control  for province-specific differences in implementing the central government's
policies. Year dummies capture macro shocks over time: the increasing intensity of
cornpetition from village and township firms, and collective firms; policy changes; and
trends of decentralized reforms.
The empirical results are displayed in table 3 (panel A for discrete, and panel B
for continuous dependent variables).
MRS (panel A) and Firm Pay Elasticity (panel B)
The results show that firms with higher productivity adopted MRS more readily.  Further,
better-performing firms tended to have higher firm wage elasticity, representative of
high-powered incentives.  These observations support self-selection hypotheses.31
The MRS Probit results also suggest that firms in industries with more volatile
profits appeared to be more reluctant to adopt MRS. This is consistent with insurance-
incentive-tradeoff hypothesis.  In addition, larger firms were more likely to adopt MRS.
31 Some  may question  whether  the positive  correlation  between  MRS and efficiency  level is
merely  a manifestation  of reverse  causality:  low  profitability  is caused  by tighter  control  (as indicated  by
no MARS  contract)  and a lower  plan price for strategically  important  products.  However,  the profit measure
I use is lagged  one period,  and, should  be viewed,  therefore,  as predetermined.  As a result,  the causality  is
more likely  to be from  lower productivity  to tighter  control. Moreover,  Xu (1996) finds  that, relative  to
firms  that had not eventually  adopted  MRS,  those  that did enjoyed  significantly  higher  productivity  even
before  the adoption  of MRS,  a piece of evidence  against  reverse  causality.
21Table 3.  The Determinants of Property Rights Structure of Chinese SOEs
Panel A.  Discrete Dependent Variables
Dependent  Variable:
Change of management  Adopting MRS  Delegating autonomy  Delegating managerial
wage discretion
Probit  Change in  Probit  Change in  Probit  Change in  Probit  Change in
estimates  prob. when Xi  Estimates  prob. when Xi  Estimates  prob.  when  Estimates  prob.  when Xi
change by  change by  Xi change by  change by one
one standard  one standard  one standard  standard
deviation  deviation  deviation  deviation
Number  of Observation  3463  3825  4234  5418
Log likelihood  -1338.02  -939.32  -1186.41  -823.16
Prob.  (the event  happens  this year)  .145  .107  .090  .040
In(value  added  per capita at the  -.057  -.016  .093*  .019  -.067*  -.009  -.004  -.0002
previous  year)  (.037)  (.048)  (.040)  (.049)
Variation  coefficient  of avg.  value  -6.091**  -.030  -7.623**  -.032  -6.201**  -.017  2.554  .003
added in the industry  at year t  (2.694)  (3.848)  (2.931)  (3.262)
ln(capital-labor  ratio)  .045  .009  -.089*  -.015  .080  .009  .029  .001
(.045)  (.053)  (.048)  (.055)
In(number of employees)  .067*  .018  .184***  .042  -.044  -.007  .139***  .007
(.034)  (.042)  (.036)  (.042)
22Panel B.  Continuos  Dependent  Variables
Dependent  Variable:
Firm Pay  Base retention  Marginal  Mandatory-plan  % investment  % investment  % investment
Elasticity  rate of profit  retention rate of  share  financed  by gov't  financed  by bank  financed  by
profit  fund  loans  retained profits
Model  OLS  Fixed  effects  Random  effects  Fixed  effects  Random  effects  Random  effects  random  effects
Number  of observations  617  3848  2397  2715  4034  4154  3197
R-Square  .124  .109  .080  .040  .091  .113  .053
In(value added per capita at the  .086***  -.014**  .005  .014*  -.017**  .024***  .022***
previous year)  (.019)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.008)  (.006)
Variation coefficient of avg. value  1.380  -.049  -.600**  -.032  -.178  -.194  -.034
added in  the industry  at year t  (1.843)  (.249)  (.279)  (.296)  (.279)  (.316)  (.209)
ln(capital-labor  ratio)  -.035*  .010  .014  -.017*  .011  .034***  -.022**
(.021)  (.009)  (.010)  (.010)  (.009)  (.010)  (.007)
ln(number  of employees)  .030*  -.074***  -.013  .090***  .020*  .010  -.015
(.015)  (.025)  (.015)  (.028)  (.011)  (.012)  (.010)
Note. In random  effects regression  and Probit estimations,  other included  variables  are 9 industry  dummies,  9 year dummies,  four governance  dummies,  and
three  province  dummies. In fixed  effects regressions,  other  included  variables  are 9 year dummies. Estimates  with ***  are significant  at 1% level, with ** at
5%, and with * at 10%.
23As discussed earlier, on the one hand, to the extent MRS might have an autonomy
component, MRS should be less likely for large firms because they offered more control
amenity to the government; on the other hand, their lower governance costs made large
firms more likely to have MRS.  The finding that larger firms were more likely to be
under MRS indicates that the governance costs consideration was, perhaps, more
important than control amenity consideration in determining firms' participation in MRS.
Finally, more capital-intensive firms were less likely to adopt MRS. This supports
the control amenity hypothesis, which maintains that the government will be more
reluctant to grant a firm independence if it represents a higher control amenity. As
discussed earlier, when granting MRS to firns,  the government has to be concerned more
about relatively capital-intensive firms: there is greater potential efficiency loss
associated with the abuse of capital that is spawned by the explicit pay sensitivity in
MRS. Indeed, the firm pay elasticity regression suggests that more capital-intensive firns
had lower pay sensitivity. Since (from table 2) pay sensitivity should decrease with
capital intensity by Alchian-Demsetz and control-amenity hypotheses, and increase by
TFP-capital-complementarity hypothesis, the result implies that the considerations
associated with the first two hypotheses were more important than that with the third. In
addition, larger firms tended to have higher pay sensitivity.  This finding is consistent
with the Alchian-Demsetz hypotheses.
The Managerial Wage Discretion (panel A)
The delegation of managerial wage discretion is not affected by past performance and the
volatility of profits in the firm's industry.  Meanwhile it increases with capital intensity
(statistically insignificant) and the size of employment.  These observations are broadly
consistent with the Alchian-Demsetz hypotheses and the TFP-capital-complementarity
hypothesis: larger and more capital-intensive firms need more discretion to monitor.
24The Change of Management
I tried two specifications for the determinants of management change. In table 2
performance was measured by the level of value added in the previous year; in table 3, it
was measured by the difference of value added between last year and the year before.
Besides fitting the data better, the latter variable is economically more meaningful as
well: the difference can filter out firm-specific advantage in price and market power.
The findings from both specifications largely draw the same conclusions. Larger
employment entailed higher likelihood of management turnover. So it appears that the
government was aware of the increasing benefits of management change in larger firms.
In addition, higher volatility of profits in the industry of the firm was associated with less
chance of management change. So the government was more cautious to point fingers at
managers when there was more uncertainty involved with a firm's profitability. Finally,
poorer performance gave rise to higher management turnover. The result is stronger when
we used the change of profits rather than the level as the performance measure. So the
government indeed based management change on profitability. These findings support
the management-discipline hypothesis.
Table 4.  The Determinants of management turnover: another specification
dependent variable: changing management
Model  Probit  Change in prob. when Xi change
Estimates  by one standard deviation
Number of observations  2813
Log likelihood.  -1271.33
Probability that the event happens this year  .145
Change of average value added from (t-2) to (t-1)  -.107*  -.018
(.060)
Variation coefficient of avg. value added in the industry at year t  -5.727*  -.035
(2.972)
In kt,  -In k1. 2 .008  .001
(.102)
ln(number of employees)  .062*  .021
_ ____________________________________________________  (.035)
25Note. Other  included  variables  are the same  as in Probit model  of table 2.  Estimates  with * are significant  at 10%
level.
Profit  Retention  Rates (panel  B)
Profit  retention  rates seem  to play multiple  roles. First, the base profit  retention  rate acted
as a transfer  mechanism:  the base retention  rate was negatively  related  to the firm's past
performance,  while the marginal  retention  rate was not affected  by this measure. It
appears the government  used base retention  rate as a transfer  mechanism  to narrow  the
gap of income  between  rich and poor firms. 32 This observation  is consistent  with the
equality-motive  hypothesis.  Second,  profit retention  rates acted  as insurance.  SOEs
in industries  with higher volatility  of profits faced  lower  marginal  retention  rates.  This is
consistent  with insurance-incentive-tradeoff  hypothesis.  That is, firms  facing  higher  risks
should  have lower-powered  incentives. Third, profit retention  rates acted  as
complementary  incentive  arrangements  to centralized  control.  Larger  SOEs  were granted
lower  profit retention  rates (insignificant  for the marginal  rate, and significant  for the base
rate). This finding  should  be looked  at  jointly with an observation  made later,  namely,  the
government  tended  to maintain  more  direct  control  and give  lower-powered  incentives  to
larger firms. The finding  is also consistent  with control-amenity  hypothesis,  which holds
that, because  larger firms  signal  better control  amenity,  they are more likely  to be
centrally  controlled.
Production Decision Rights
This category includes production autonomy (panel A) and the mandatory-plan share
(panel B).  By both measures, SOEs with worse performance in the previous year were
found more likely to have production autonomy. As a result, efficient firms were
implicitly penalized while inefficient ones rewarded. This is consistent with the equality-
32 Since  the  base  profit  is a fixed  amount,  the  number  (base  profit  x base  retention  rate)  is  just a
lump  sum  transfer.
26motive hypothesis.  In addition, SOEs in industries of higher volatility were less likely to
have production autonomy. This renders support for our insurance-incentive-tradeoff
hypothesis.  Finally, larger SOEs seemed to be less likely to have production autonomy.
This is consistent with the control-amenity hypothesis: the govemrnent is less likely to
give up control to larger firms because of their high control amenity.
More capital-intensive firms were found to have better chance of production
aultonomy  (insignificant) and  lower mandatory-plan share (significant). This is consistent
with the TFP-capital-complementarity hypothesis: an efficiency-minded government will
grant autonomy to more capital-intensive firms because TFP and capital-intensity are
complementary in raising productivity.
Financing Arrangements (Panel B)
The results show that, first, SOEs with better past performance relied more on bank loans
and their profit retention for investment, and less on government funds. Thus the
government appeared to use investment financing to reduce income inequality across
finns. This piece of evidence supports the equality-motive hypothesis.  It also indicates
the presence of "ratchet effects:" the govermment,  in striving for equality, rewarded
inefficient firms while penalized efficient ones. Second, capital-intensive firms depended
more on bank loans  and less on their own retained profits, probably reflecting both their
greater need for capital, and the banks' role in allocating investment funds. Finally, larger
firmns  relied more heavily on the government for investment.  This is consistent with the
conrtrol-amenity  hypothesis: because larger firms present better control amenity, they
tended to receive more centralized control as reflected in the traditional financing
arrangement.
V. Concluding Remarks
27We have examined how Chinese SOEs and government partitioned property rights. Table
5 summarizes this paper by listing the hypotheses and specific empirical findings, which
were generally consistent. The predictions were generated from the following framework:
with three goals in mind (revenue or profitability, control and inter-firm equality), the
risk-neutral government designs incentives, control rights and financing arrangements to
cope with the information advantage of firms. Many pieces of evidence lend credence to
the framework: when granting capital-intensive SOEs managerial wage discretion and
low pay sensitivity, the government appeared to reduce the harm associated with
employees' discretion in pursuing short-run rewards;  when using profitability as a
criterion to judge managers, it appeared to align managerial incentives with its efficiency
goal;  when granting high-powered incentives for better-performing firms and low-
powered incentives for poorly-performing ones, it appeared to use contract to reveal the
types of firms, and thus achieve a tradeoff of incentives and extracting rent;  when it was
more willing to implement MRS in larger firms, again at the heart is the information
problem -- it incurs higher monitoring costs to supervise 100 firms of one employee than
to supervise a firm with 100 employees.
The findings of this paper offer some insights about the sources of inefficiency of
SOEs.  One source is the dynamic inefficiency uncovered in this paper: the "ratchet
effects," represented by giving better firms lower base retention rates and less subsidized
investment funds, make efficient firms unwilling to reveal their true efficiency level;
instead, they pretend to be inefficient by slacking so that they can get more transfers. So
there are inherent conflicts between two of the government's goals: the revenue
objectives and the equality goals. Another source of inefficiency is the control motive of
the government, which prevents many SOEs from becoming decentralized and therefore
improving their productivity. The final source is, perhaps, the most difficult to tackle: the
information problem embedded in the government-enterprises relationship. To the extent
that the government can design mechanisms to reduce managers' informational
28Table 5. Matching Hypotheses and Evidence
Hypothesis  Evidence
Insurance-incentives-tradeoff'  firms facing more  risks will  Firms in industries  with more profit volatility had lower
be given lower-powered  incentives;  the government  will  marginal  profit retention rates, more centralized
manage  their operations  more directly.  production  control, and were less likely to adopt MRS.
Self-selection,:  Efficient  firms will choose  MRS with strong  Firms with better past performances  adopted  MRS more
incentives,  while inefficient  ones will self-select  into either  often, and had higher firm-level  pay sensitivity.
MRS with weak incentives  or no MRS.
Alchian-Demnsetz  Hypothesis  (about internal  labor  The firm-level  pay sensitivity  increased  with firm size,
incentives):  to prevent employees  from pursuing  short-run  and decreased  with capital intensity.  The tendency to
bonus too ag!gressively  by abusing equipment,  in more  grant managerial  wage discretion  to a firm increased
capital-intensive  firms the manager  should depend  more on  with both its capital intensity  and size.
monitoring  (managerial  wage discretion)  and less on pay
sensitivity  to motivates  employees. Moreover,  when a firm
is larger, stronger  internal labor incentives  are called for.
Management-Discipline:  To motivate  managers,  their careers  Managers were more likely to be replaced when recent
will be made dependent  on their performance.  The discipline  productivity  change was smaller, or when firm size was
is more beneficial in bigger firms because  the productivity  larger, or when the industries  they were in had lower
gains are multiplied by the size of the firm. However,  when  volatility of profits
the noisiness  of environment  is large,  management  turnover
is unlikely  to function  well as a discipline device.
Governance  Costs:  in governing  firms the government  will  Larger firns were more likely to have MRS, and less so
try to reduce governance  costs, which implies that larger  to have production  autonomy,  and had larger  mandatory-
firms will be more likely  to have MRS and less so to have  plan share.
production  decision  rights.
Control-Ameniity:  the government  will control firms whose  Larger firms were under a more centralized  control
control amenity is higher. Better control amenity lies in  mode: lower profit retention  rates, less  production
larger firms, or in more capital-intensive  firms in the  autonomy,  and more investment  from government  funds.
presence  of explicit pay sensitivity  to profit.  They were not, however, less likely to have MRS, as
predicted  by control amenity hypothesis.  This indicates
that in determining  MRS for larger  firms, governance
costs were the dominant  consideration.  More capital-
intensive  firms were less likely to be under MRS.
TFP-Capital-Complementarity:  Complementary  to capital  More capital-intensive  firms had better chance of
intensity  in raising productivity  are production  autonomy,  enjoying  production  autonomy  and managerial  wage
marginal  retention rate, firm-level  pay sensitivity,  and  discretion, had a higher marginal retention  rate and a
managerial  wage discretion.  In pursuing  efficiency,  the  lower mandatory-plan  share. These firms, however,  were
government  will allow more capital-intensive  firms to have  not more likely to have higher firm-level  pay sensitivity
higher marginal  retention rates, higher firm-level  pay  (as predicted  by this hypothesis);  so the control-amenity
sensitivity,  and higher likelihood  of production  autonomy  and Alchian-Demsetz  hypotheses  dominated  this
and managerial  wage discretion.  hypothesis  in determining  firm-level  pay sensitivity.
Equality-Motive:  The government  has an intention to reduce  Firms with worse performance  were allowed higher base
inequality  among  firms.  profit retention  rate, higher share of investment  from
government  funds and lower share from self-financing,
and more likely to have production  autonomy.
29advantage, the SOE reforms can improve productivity. Additional evidence in support of
this claim comes from Groves et al (1995),33  who find that firms whose management
replacements were filled by bidding procedure experienced higher efficiency gains than
firms that used other procedures which did not reveal as much information about firms.
However, agency problems, especially the information advantage of SOEs, coupled with
objectives of the government that deviate from profits, may severely limit the mileage
one can expect from incentive- and contract-based partial reforms.
3 3See note  2.
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